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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini membahas bagaimana perubahan tata kelola hutan di Indonesia yang dimulai sejak tahun 1990-an yang bertujuan untuk meningkatkan kesetaraan, partisipasi
dan manajemen berkelanjutan telah menunjukkan hasil yang diharapkan. Pada masa
Orde Baru, kewenangan utama dalam pengelolaan dan pemberian izin eksploitasi hutan berada pada pemerintah pusat. Dengan tujuan untuk meningkatkan efisiensi dan
kesetaraan, kewenangan tersebut sebagian diberikan pada pemerintah daerah pada
era desentralisasi. Namun, dalam konteks Indonesia, perubahan institusi tersebut tidak
sepenuhnya memunculkan hasil yang diharapkan. Tarik menarik kepentingan antara
pemerintah pusat dan daerah serta adanya resistensi kelembagaan menjadikan proses
desentralisasi bidang kehutanan terhambat. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan
bagaimana proses tersebut terjadi.
Kata kunci: desentralisasi, resentralisasi, tata kelola hutan, path dependen, Indonesia
ABSTRACT
This article examines whether reform forest governance in Indonesia started in the
1990s, which was partially aimed to promote equity, participation and sustainable
forest management, has delivered its promised consequences. In the New Order era,
the central government had sole authority in managing forests and granting exploitation rights. This authority has been partially transferred to local governments during a decentralization process to achieve greater efficiency and equity. However, the
Indonesian case highlights that such institutional change has not yet produced the
expected outcomes. The case indicates a contestation between the local and central
government along with institutional resistance, which have considerably undermined
decentralization processes in the forestry sector. This paper explores possible explanations for these processes.
Keywords: decentralization, recentralization, forest governance, path dependency,
Indonesia
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I N T RODUC T ION

Concerns over forest management policy reforms in Indonesia first
emerged in the 1980s through the World Bank and NGOs proposals.
The World Bank proposed a number of market-oriented programs such
as eliminating restrictions on log exports, increasing forest taxes and creating competitive concession allocations, while the NGOs focused on
community forestry and conservation. However, policy processes dominated by the central government with limited participation of non-state
stakeholders hindered all potential reforms (Silva et al. 2002). Demands
for old arrangement reform and decentralized resource management
mounted, following the 1997 economic crisis and the decline of the
New Order government.
The reform was marked by two characteristics. First, it was a bureaucrat-dominated agenda since the law mainly comes from the Ministry
of Forestry’s proposal. Even though many stakeholders are involved in
the post-economic crisis forest policy reform, their involvement tends to
be marginalized in the final policy making process. Some accuse the
government of largely ignoring recommendations from the stakeholders.
The central government is more concerned with allocating concession
licenses to local governments than with the decentralizing of forest
control (Lindayanti 2003; Gellert 2010). Central government remains
in control over the determination of forest areas and changes in their
status and function, including conversion, as well as over the management of various conservation and protected areas. Central domination
over the forestry sector is clearly stated in article 7 of Law 22/1999
which reserves natural resource utilization to the center (World Bank
2001). Second, forestry reform indicates the process of decentralization
to centralization. Nevertheless, this pattern is not new in forest-rich
developing countries. Central governments, supported by various vested interests, apply many ways to undermine decentralization reforms
(Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006). They resist any reform to preserve
their privileges. Concerning the liberalization of the forest industry,
resistance comes from domestic businesses over timber industry refor-
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ms. Various reforms proposed by the World Bank and IMF failed due
to these resistances (Gellert 2010).
A large amount has been written about decentralization and recentralization related forestry sector in Indonesia. Most of the analysis
focuses on the effects of decentralization and recentralization (Bulliger
& Haug 2012), bureaucratic and power interplay (Sahide et al. 2016),
lesson learnt from decentralization process (Dermawan, Komarudin,
and McGrath 2006; Ardiansyah, Marthen, and Amalia 2015), and also
the mechanism of weakening decentralization process (Ribot, Agrawal,
and Larson 2006). Despite the large amount of literature, little attention
has been paid to how or why the persistence of the central government’s
role on forest management can be explained. Some argue that one should examine the legislative process, its timing, and the value of forest
and land. Since the New Order, sectoral departments at the national
level have relatively been the main source of policies (Lindayanti 2003).
As a consequence, laws were laid down to serve administrative bureaucracy rather than to serve national interests (Patlis 2005). In terms
of timing, new forest laws were proposed and enacted when the old
regime was still in power. The result may have been different if the law
was produced after the new government was established. Furthermore,
compared to other departments, such as mining and fisheries, forests
are contested spaces in which struggles and conflict over land and trees
continues over time. Long historical jurisdiction over forests and its land
also shapes current policies.
This paper aims to review the development of forest governance in
Indonesia in connection with the centralization and decentralization
process mainly from 1960s to 2000s. Through examination of existing
and historical records of laws related to forestry, it argues that political
and economic values of forest as well as institutional interest hinder the
decentralization efforts. In what follows, the paper examines the development and persistence of central government control over forest. To
support the argument, the data were gathered mainly from the literature
and document as well as field research in 2011.
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PAT H DEPEN DENC Y, I NS T I T U T ION A N D P OL IC Y

Path dependency is one of the features of historical institutionalism
which represents an attempt to describe how political struggles are mediated by an institution. Institutions shape the goals of what political
actors pursue and the way they structure power relations (Hall and
Taylor 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1998). An institution is defined as:
“…the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order
to the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank–firm
relations (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).”
To be empirically observable, this paper defines an institution in narrow and broad ways. The former defines institutions as the array of
administrative procedures and regulatory laws, while the latter sees
institution as the core structural characteristic of the state and society,
be it centralized or decentralized. Those characteristics determine power distribution as well as the capacity of bureaucrats and politicians
(Ikenberry 1994).
The key idea behind path dependency is that, once established, certain courses of policy development can be hard to reverse. It is because
state bureaucracy and other vested interests are resistant to change. As
a result, the likelihood of radical policy change is significantly reduced
(Kemp 2000). Past social policy choices create strong vested interests
and expectations, which are extremely difficult to undo even in the
present era (Pierson 2000).
Path dependency as a causal process is highly sensitive to the early stage events. In a path dependency sequence, the order in which
alternatives are presented can significantly affect the outcome. Once
contingent historical events take place, path-dependent sequences are
marked by relatively deterministic causal patterns or inertia. Inertia
involves the mechanism of reproduction that reproduces a particular
institution over time (Mahoney 2000).

GUARDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER FOREST

9

One way to recognize mechanisms of reproduction is by examining
the distribution of power (Ikenberry 1994; Mahoney 2000). In relation
to power and vested interests, Thelen (1999) argues, “We need to know
exactly who is invested in particular institutional arrangements, exactly
how that investment is sustained over time, and perhaps how those who
are not invested in the institutions are kept out.” Furthermore, Modell,
Jacobs, and Wiesel (2007) argue that an analysis of path dependency
should be extended to examine what competing alternatives to existing
institutional arrangement were available and why these were rejected
at that specific time.
In policy development, path dependency more likely occurs when
the policy allocates different authorities to a particular group. It also
appears since policies involve investment and disinvestment. A new
policy often brings about new administration capacity which resists
change after its establishment. The resistance is due to its learning
effect and any social or political cost. In politics, the absence or weakness of efficiency-enhancing mechanisms of competition and learning,
shorter time horizons of political actors and stronger status quo biases
generally built into political institutions lead to path dependence (Kay
2005; Pierson 2000).
The complexities of existing institutions may generate unintended
consequences, sometimes undesirable ones (Hall and Taylor 1996). Specific state structures, created for a purpose, can be taken over by other
groups seeking to establish policy capabilities in a different area. Once
established, support by actors’ interests will endure and evolve. The
result is often unexpected and ironic (Ikenberry 1994).
Path dependency is well recognized for its advantage to explain
stability. The question comes when path dependency should explain policy change. Policy makers need to wait and fulfill several factors before
creating an opportunity for policy change. Some empirical research on
policy change and path dependency conclude that policy changes may
occur as a result of reaction to unintended consequences or exogenous
shocks such as economic crises and war (Kay 2005).
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FOR ES T G OV ER NA NCE I N I N D ON ESI A :
T ER R I T OR I A L I Z AT ION A N D DE V E L OPM EN T

Over decades, forest management in Indonesia has represented a highly
centralized control. It was initiated by the Dutch colonial authorities
through territorialization mechanism. The mechanism was to control
land, its resources and people. The territorialization process was carried
out and strengthened by Indonesian government after its independence.
In the New Order era, Soeharto proposed a development project which
was characterized by central planning and technocratic idea.

Ter ritorialization
Territorialization refers to an act of controlling particular specific boundaries, including people’s activities and natural resources within. The
definition of territorialization pinpoints some goals, which are: (1) claiming over territory, (2) protecting the people within the territory and
their access to natural resources, and (3) regulating incomes from taxes
(Peluso & Vandergest 1995). These goals underline the role of central
government to control over the territory. In the context of Indonesia,
these dynamics of reterritorialization are exemplified by increasing orientation towards the world market and rescaling of territorial organization and forms of governance.
Nevertheless, forest management in Indonesia can be historically
traced back since the Dutch colonialization. During that time, the
Dutch mainly controlled forest in Java, while forests in the outer islands (outside Java) were controlled by more diverse authorities. The
Dutch’s control over the forest in Java itself marked the beginning of
forest management practice in Indonesia. It was practically conducted
by professional foresters based on the European-style management that
involved scientific principles (Peluso 1994). The Dutch colonial administration over the Java and Madura’s teak forests was legally sustained
by the Agrarian Law of 1870. This Law gave the Dutch colonial government exclusive rights over forest by declaring that all the “unclaimed”
or “wasteland[s]” were the property of the colonial state. This Law also
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defined “wasteland” as an area of land which was not continuously
under cultivation (Lindayati 2003). Therefore, it can be said that the
Agrarian Law of 1870 became the foundation of the Basic Forestry Law
of 1967 upon which the Soeharto regime laid claim to 66% of the state
land mass as state property (Barber 1989).
The New Order government continued to maintain the Dutch legacy in controlling forest areas, mainly in Java. The Indonesian Forest
Service was established in the late 1945, but still was more concentrated
in Java. The management of Forest Service remained highly centralized
and had a strong predisposition for managing forests for timber production according to the principles of scientific forestry (Barr et al. 2006).
This was not in accordance with the rules as most of Java’s forests are
teak plantation and categorized as timber estates, which actually could
not be functioned as natural production forests. The story was quite
different with forests in the outer islands which covered 97 percent of
forests land in Indonesia. After the declaration of independence, forests
in the outer islands considered as natural resource were controlled by
forest dwellers.
With the Agrarian Law of 1870 as its legal precedent, the 1967 Basic Forestry Law delegitimized land tenure. The impact was found in
Kalimantan where most of Dayak people employed widened agriculture. The land tenure in Dayak is either communally-owned or without
owner at all, thus justifying its classification as state land. The Basic
Forestry Law stipulates that state-sanctioned forest production initiatives
take priority over customary law systems (Rhee 2006).
The territorialization of forests was implemented through these 3
(three) following aspects: (1) the enactment of boundaries, (2) the classification of the forest lands for specific purposes, and (3) the designation
of rights to resources. A set of regulations—including the Basic Forestry
Law—becomes legal preconditions in determining ownership and rights
of people’s access to land and resources within this territory. State forest lands were categorized into conservation forests, protected forests,
production forests, and recreation forests (Barr et al. 2006), dividing
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zones for different activities and expanding both commercial logging
and agriculture.
In the mid-1970s, territorialization efforts were pushed by the central
government through the integration of smallholders in a capitalist plantation agriculture system by means of contract farming, called Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (PIR). The PIR scheme consisted of a core plantation
(inti) and associated smallholder plots (rakyat/people) of approximately
two hectares per family in a core-to-smallholder ratio of about 20:80 or
30:70. Through this scheme, the central government facilitated state-owned plantation companies in gaining access to land, developing
infrastructure, and setting up the core plantation. As a replacement,
the core plantation provided smallholders with the management of oil
palm plots and the access to national and international markets (Zen,
Barlow, and Gondowarsito 2005).
To strengthen its control, the New Order government also initiated
the Village Governance Law of 1979. The law appointed local leaders
as the representatives of the state. This law introduced a secular administrative structure of villages (desa) to replace the existing customary
(adat) structures, although the two often coexisted. Initially, the law
acknowledged village autonomy and public participation. It turned out
just unexpectedly, settling a system that perpetuated the penetration of
central government’s control over the village and an inflexibly hierarchical top-down process of decision-making (Wollenberg, Moeliono,
and Limberg 2009)

Developmentalism
Similar to most of newly independent countries, the New Order government put priority in pursuing development. The term development
means to construct and to awaken (Lindayanti 2003). Development
was then elaborated into long (25 years) and short terms plans (5 years
known as Pelita), through which the government and the planners,
social engineers, established the ideals, boundaries, and categories to regulate and reconfigure people’s lives. National development plans were
elaborated by sectors, each having its own specific institutional criteria
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and indicators to complement the national development framework to
define development problems and measure successes (Lindayanti 2003).
In the first and the second Pelita (1969/70 - 1978/79), forestry development was meant to gain cash/capital for national development.
Through the enactment of the Law Number 1 of 1967 about Foreign
Investment and the Law Number 6 of 1968 about Domestic Investment,
forest contribution on national development was possible to achieve.
These laws resulted in new development initiatives in Indonesia’s forestry, which then drastically changed Indonesia into a major producer
and exporter of tropical logs in the world. It marked the beginning of
a forest concession era, which made forest sector the second largest
export earnings after oil and became an important economic indicator
value (Lindayanti 2003).
During the third Pelita (1979/80 - 1983/84), development in the
forestry sector was more directed toward reforestation and land rehabilitation efforts. These were the result of the increasing area of hydrologically-critical lands throughout the country. In the outer islands
(outside Java), the critical lands expanded mostly due to shifting cultivation activities practiced by local farmers. The focus and goals in
the fourth Pelita (1984/85 - 1988/89), meanwhile, was more to forest
products development. The aims of the development were to promote
the added value of forest products, open opportunities of employment,
and generate higher income. In 1985, a new policy on log export ban
was issued, resulting in the acceleration of forest products industries in
Indonesia (Lindayanti 2003).
The fifth Pelita (1989/90 - 1993/94) was considered as the most
strategically important stage since it was the last Pelita for the first
long-term development plan. Its outcomes would influence further development in the second long term development plan that began in
Pelita VI (1994/95 - 1998/99). Forestry development in the fifth Pelita
focused on law enforcement for forest concession holders, shifting cultivation practices control and industrial forest plantations development.
Enforcement policy on sustainable development was also started during
this stage. Log production was limited to 31.4 million cubic meters per
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year; reforestation tax and saw-timber export fee were increased as well
(Lindayanti 2003).
Lindayanti (2003) argues that the forestry sector plays three main
roles in Indonesia’s national development. First, forestry has to maintain sustainable production. Second, forestry has to support forest-based
industries and exports. Third, forestry has to continue and increase the
aspect of nature conservation. Practically, economic growth-oriented
policies in forestry development are shown through the value-added
promotion of forest products and a significant share in the world tropical timber market.
Territorialization stimulated regional expressions of discontent, separatist movements in resource-rich provinces, e.g. in Aceh and West
Papua, and developmentalism approach created marginalization (Rhee
2006). The 1997 economic downturn, the collapse of Soeharto regime
in 1998 and the increasing domestic and internal pressure forced the
new government reform. After more than three decades of a highly
centralized system of land control and territorialization, a share of decision-making power was transferred to district governments.
FOR ES T P OL IC Y R EFOR M

Forestry reform in Indonesia has taken place for a lengthy process.
Initiated in the 1980s, it came into effect after 20 years. In the 1980s,
the New Order government tried to strengthen logging regulation and
increase timber rent. The efforts did not succeed due to low enforcement, corruption, and an inappropriate rent allocation. Two dominant
actors, the Ministry of Forestry and timber industries, had no incentive
for the reform. Another barrier was the lack of competing power to press
policy change as NGOs and International Organization were excluded
from policy processes (Silva et al. 2002).
The main objectives of forest policy in the New Order were generation of foreign exchange, fiscal resources and employment opportunities, promotion of industrialization through forest-based industry,
and regional development (Gillis 1988). Although some might have
different arguments related to those objectives and their achievement,
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Gillis (1988) believes that most of those objectives were not successful.
By over-emphasizing the economic value of forests, the government
also undermined the local communities’ rights and forest sustainability.
The New Order government at first kept timber rent low to create
and maintain loyalty and networks, mainly from the military and other
Soeharto cronies and family (Ross 1996; Brown 2001). Collected official
rent was used for other objectives rather than for forest sustainability.
These non-forestry projects included SEA Games 1997 funding and
Indonesia aerospace development (Ascher 1998).
After the 1997 economic crisis and the pressure to reform the governance in all aspects, general forestry policy objectives remained the
same. However, it has incorporated some issues related to equity, participation and decentralization of rent distribution. Some policy instruments were introduced such as granting rights to local governments to
distribute small concession licenses. A new scheme of share distribution
in all new extended concessions should be 20% to cooperative and 10%
to provincial government forestry corporations (Brown 1999). Other
policy instruments were also installed, particularly those related to the
duration of concessions. During the New Order, the government set the
minimum limit of concession area at 50.000 hectares for 20 years and
non-transferable, while in the decentralization era the limit varied and
the duration ranged from 1 to 100 years. The government also increased
royalty taxes and introduced performance bonds to concession licensers.
Although the new forestry law does not provide secure tenure, it
revives customary communities and promotes their involvement in forest management. The new law strengthens local communities’ rights
to use the forest for daily consumption needs and to undertake forest
management activities based on the customary rules as long as the rules
do not conflict with state laws (Wollenberg and Kartodihardjo 2002).
Concerned about rent distribution and participation, the government introduced new concession forms to be granted by local government through HPHH (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan/Forest Product
Harvesting Rights) and IPKK (Izin Pemungutan dan Pemanfaatan Kayu/
Timber Extraction and Utilization Rights) mechanisms to cooperatives
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or individuals. At the provincial level, concessions were granted up to
10,000 hectares, while at the district level, regents were allowed to grant
concessions of up to 100 hectares for timber extraction within conversion forests, or production forest bound for conversion or reclassification.
Both HPHH and IPKK gave more access to local people for extracting
forest products although it was stated that HPHH could not be issued
on areas that have been granted large-scale timber concession rights
(HPH).
These small-scale concessions significantly contributed to locally
generated revenues. In Bulungan District, for example, IPKK contributed to 50% and 40% of locally generated revenues in 2000 and 2001.
In Kapuas Hulu District, forest activities based on IPKK and HPHH
schemes were even more striking, contributing to more than 85% of
locally generated revenues (Barr et al. 2006).
Authorization of district governments to issue small-scale forest product extraction licenses was considered fostering deforestation rates and
forest degradation in Indonesia. Community-based concessions were
also entrusted with providing a medium for the formalization of illegal
logging in order to increase regional revenues. District heads in this
term were able to generate taxes and more income including a number
of informal payments rooting from the initial share of IPKK payments
and small-concession permits. The district of Indragiri Hulu Riau, for
example, granted illegal sawmills with legal documents to legitimize
the mills. In Central Kalimantan, one district head imposed a tax of
Rp 125,000 per cubic meter of timber transported by ships to destinations outside the regency, without the nationally required documents
(Scotland 2000).
However, it is doubted whether small or medium sized concessions
were really the main cause of deforestation and thus threatened forest
sustainability. If compared to HPH concessions, community-based concessions only extracted a small portion of the forests. Obidzinsky (2005)
rebuts the discourse saying that small concessions are responsible for
illegal logging and deforestation is driven by established timber industries to maintain power over forest resources.
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The decentralization era was also marked by conflicts among communities and between communities and investors. Conflicts also occurred between centrally-managed big concessions and district-issued
small concessions. The conflicts were usually related to land ownership,
boundaries and distribution of profit (Dermawan, Komarudin, and McGrath 2006). It took place mostly in the forest-rich regions in Indonesia
such as in Kalimantan and Papua.
Due to increasing deforestation, conflicts and overlaps with larger
concessions, the central government revoked a policy which gave local governments authority to grant small concession licenses in 2002,
strengthening their authority over commercial timber extraction (Dermawan, Komarudin, and McGrath 2006). At this point, decentralization of forest management was considered over.
F ROM T H E N E W OR DER T O P OS TDECEN T R A L I Z AT ION: T H E PER SIS T ENCE OF
CEN T R A L G OV ER N M EN T CON T ROL OV ER FOR ES T

Political and economic values of forest and its land supported by institutional and individual interests, the Ministry of Forestry and its bureaucrats, produced not only non-extensive reform but also reaffirmed
the central government’s roles in forestry. The pattern shows the central
government’s resistance to give up its power over land and forests. Along
with decentralization reform, the central government and the Ministry
of Forestry preferred to strengthen their power rather than to support
local government capacity for better forest management. It shows their
resistance to any change which might threaten their interests. Legislative processes in Indonesia, which are mainly dominated by sectoral
agencies, have smoothed the recentralization process.
Control over land has intensified since the late 1960s. The government established its presence to the lowest level through a pervasive
military and bureaucracy. Resettlement programs (transmigration) for
Javanese until the end of the New Order to certain areas such as Kalimantan and Papua were also a device to diffuse and reinforce control
over territory. Transmigration of retired military personnel was emplo-
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yed to guarantee security and stability in an Indonesian border (East Kalimantan), secessionist movement regions (such as in Aceh and Papua),
and unstable regions (East Timor). Intensification of physical access to
territory allowed for increasing control and exploitation of resources
(Barber 1986). Furthermore, the social and physical infrastructures associated with transmigration (e.g. roads, dam, marketing systems) have
facilitated the spread of industrialism such as export-oriented agribusiness and industrial agriculture (Elmhirst 1999).
In his early period of power in 1965, Soeharto faced economic
and political crisis. Economically, high inflation and budget deficits
forced the new government to adopt policies favoring foreign investors.
Politically, Soeharto faced fractious militaries which might challenge
his authority. To gain control over militaries, Soeharto used patronage
to reward supporters and developed their loyalty (Ross 2001). Centralized-forest management was adopted to facilitate those economic and
political needs.
The New Order government enacted the Basic Forestry Law (BFL)
in 1967 to strengthen their authority over forests. It authorized the Directorate General of forestry in Jakarta to control all of Indonesia’s forest
lands which covered 75 percent of the country. Consequently, the law
extended the forestry department’s jurisdiction from 3 million to 146
million hectares (Ross 2001). In order to control the outer island forests,
the government shared its authority with private sector institutions on
forest extraction and distributed concession rights to large multinational corporations. To promote competitiveness, the government lowered
forest royalties and taxes.
The government also reorganized property rights in forestry by undercutting rights of forest dwellers and local government to bust forest
industrialization. Enacting the Government Regulation No. 21/1971
and stipulating that the rights of loggers should have precedence over
customary rights when the two conflict (Ross 1996), the government
has weakened customary rights.
For the central government, the economic value of timber is
enormous. Timber products were the biggest foreign exchange of non-
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-oil resources (see Table 1). Through timber rent, Soeharto was able
to consolidate the military by channeling them into the timber exploitation business. The military became absentee concession holders
by attaining concession licenses and renting them to foreign operators
(Magenda 1989). By the 1970s, military-affiliated concession holders
were from all major services, army, navy, air force, and military intelligence (Ross 2001).
Table 1
Indonesia’s Export Earnings (in million dollars) of Total Wood
Export of Logs, Sawnwood, and Plywood, 1969-1992
Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Export Earnings (in million dollars)
Logs
Sawn timber Plywood
29
2
0
86
2
0
164
3
0
228
2
0
561
16
0
703
22
0
410
31
0
811
49
1
899
50
2
909
86
18
1550
235
32
1515
260
56
618
191
149
333
188
282
311
286
510
170
339
663
7
345
1150
7
575
1097
0
400
1764
0
580
2123
0
806
2703
0
144
2725
0
96
2871
0
360
3230

Source: Brown (2001).

To maintain jurisdiction over forests and its land, the Ministry of Forestry allied with the President. The appropriation of reforestation fees
from concessionaires by the ministry was to fund development program
activities. The ministry oversaw not only the designated forest area, with
or without forests, but also held jurisdiction over the state operations on
transmigration programs (Ascher 1998).
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Although there were no open confrontations, rivalry among departments is not a new problem. Two different orientations, namely nationalists and technocrats, held a rivalry in relation to forest rent allocation.
Nationalists were made up of a group of engineers who mainly worked
in the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology. The
latter were mainly Berkeley-graduated entrenched in the Ministry of
Finance and National Development Agencies. There were two issues
which heated the debate, whether to subsidize the wood product industry, or to develop a state aircraft industry (Ascher 1998).
The Ministry of Forestry used to be a rival to the Ministry of Agrarian over territorial control. The conflict mounted in the 1990s during
an attempt to reform forestry policy. At that time, the tenth draft of
the Basic Forestry Law (BFL) revision was discussed with stakeholders.
One of the high bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agrarian openly stated
that they should be the highest public institution to control the state
territorial authority, although such authority can be delegated to other
institutions. Responding to this statement, the Minister of Forestry suspended the BFL reform process (Lindayanti 2003).
Aside from the barriers to reform mentioned before, the legislative
process was not supportive toward initiating reform. Sectoral departments dominated all policy making processes from initiation to decision
making. During the New Order, the legislative process began with
internal bureaucracy preparing a draft, followed by public consultations
to provide comments. The consultation depended on the budget and
willingness of the bureaucracy. In the last stages, the draft was sent to
the President and House of Representative for approval.
The legislative process in the post-New Order involves more public
participation. A draft might come from either bureaucrat or House of
Representative. However, there are two similar points between the New
Order and the post-New Order concerning legislative process, which
are: (1) Sectoral bureaucracy remains to control all policy initiation process; (2) Each sectoral agency still manages their own bills. As a result,
they champion their own statute, whether in ﬁsheries, forestry, mining,
tourism, agriculture or industry. Some skeptically argue that instead of
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serving national interests, laws are enforced to serve the administrative
bureaucracy (Patlis 2005).
The new Basic Forestry Law 41/1999 was supposed to produce a
much more accommodative policy since it was initiated in the era of
openness and democratization. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Forestry
collaborated with stakeholders in initial steps only. The ministry was
more concerned with its own agenda rather than to public participation. In the final stage of the policy process, the ministry submitted its
own draft to the House of Representative with little incorporation of
stakeholders’ proposals (Lindayanti 2003).
Compared to other resource policies, the forestry law was enacted
earlier. The fishery law was enacted in 2004, while the mining law was
passed in 2009. The forestry law had been enacted before the post-New
Order government was built. This early forestry policy formulation invited interpretations as the law might preserve the interest of the New
Order. The law would have been different if enacted by the new government such as in the fishery and mining sectors. The government
would have faced difficulties in bypassing stakeholders’ interest in the
process as it was in the previous forestry policy formulation.
One argues that some of the principles of the BFL 41/1999 are similar to the draft proposed in 1990s (Lindayanti 2003). Customary forests,
for instance, is still declared as a state forest although customary management rights are clearly articulated in the new law. The government
still does not acknowledge customary claims over forest territory. The
new law only gives space for customary practice.
Forestry reform shows the pattern of half-hearted decentralization
in the initial stage which has been followed by recentralization efforts.
This half-hearted reform can be tracked since the earliest stage of decentralization in Indonesia. The BFL 41/1999, which is supposed to be
linear with the general decentralization law, speaks a different language. The new forestry law reaffirms the role of the central government in
administering the nation’s forest resources and gives only minimal authority to local/district governments. While the Government Regulation
No. 34/2002 for the technical implementation of Forestry Law assigns
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the provinces a relatively significant role, the general Decentralization
Law 22/1999 transfers greater authority to districts instead of provinces.
To strengthen its power, the government enacted Government Regulation No. 25/2000 which clearly mentions that the central government
does not devolve two primary powers: (1) the determination of forest
areas and changes in their status and function (including conversion);
(2) the management of various conservation and protected areas. The
regulation puts these functions, as well as policy and standard settings,
under direct control of the center, and assigns cross-district functions,
e.g. granting some cross-district permits, to the provinces. This allocation of most planning and implementing functions to central and provincial levels under the Government Regulation No. 25/2000 appears
to be in line with the new Law 41/1999.
On the contrary, in the case of general mining, the Government
Regulation No. 25/2000 assigns standard and criteria-setting functions
to the center and cross-district matters to the provinces. All other operations, regardless of scale, are implicitly devolved to the district. Whereas
the Ministry of Forestry’s centralized approach appears to be based on
Article 7.2 of Law 22, which reserves natural resource utilization to
the center, this radical decentralization of general mining under the
Government Regulation No. 25/2000 is pegged to article 10.1 of Law
22, which authorizes regions to manage natural resources in their areas.
Resistance to decentralization efforts from the Ministry of Forestry and central government continued since the reform in 1999 until
2014. Ardiansyah, Marthen, and Amalia (2015) describes that there were
tendencies toward recentralization since the initial reform. The year
of 2002 holds the highest number of regulation issued by the government. The one with a lasting impact was Government Regulation No.
34/2002, reinforcing the Ministry of Forestry to administer commercial timber extractions. Through this regulation, the ministry revoked
previous regulations which authorized district governments to allocate
small-scale licenses. The regulation not only authorized the Ministry
of Forestry over a large scale of timber extractions but also extended the
ministry’s control over the wood processing industry (Barr et al. 2006).
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Tendency of recentralization remains when the Law on Regional
Governance No. 32 of 2004 (revising Law No. 22 of 1999) was enacted.
The Law gives central government considerable authority to supervise
and monitor the decisions, policies and regulations adopted by regional
government. The law also authorizes the central government to impose
sanctions against regional government officials who are caught violating
or circumventing the central government supervision and monitoring
process. The tendency toward strengthening central government over
local government is also related to civil servants. The law states that any
promotions, transfers, and dismissals of civil servants at district level
must be approved by the Governor.
The tendency toward recentralization has also been underlined by
a number of studies by local researchers. Ardiansyah, Marthen, and
Amalia (2015), for example, notes that in 2007 the government transferred some minor powers to the districts through Government Regulation
(GR) No. 6 of 2007 (revised by GR No. 3 of 2008). The GR authorized
district government to issue Commercial Forest Estate Utilization Permit (IUPK). Six months later, the government also enacted the GR No.
38 of 2007 on the Division of Roles between National, Provincial and
Local Government. This regulation strengthened the role of district
governments especially on the management of production forest. These
roles included forest inventory, forest rehabilitation and reclamation,
forest protection and conservation, issuing non-timber forest products,
environmental services and forest utilization permits issuing. Similar
finding can also be found in Ekawati’s study (2012) that evaluated the
implementation of the GR No. 7 of 2007 in four districts and found.
The study reveals that the authority of the management of production
forests by local government was not meaningful. It happened because
the economically valuable authority was still held by the Central Government. The peak of recentralization was marked with the Law No.
23 of 2014 on Local Government as the only policy in 2009 and 2011
(Ardiansyah, Marthen, and Amalia 2015). On article 14 of the Law, it
is clearly stated that local government holds authority only on the ma-
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nagement of conservation of forest park. In short, central government
controls most of the authority over forest management.
Based on the discussion of the policies on forest management as
described above, this article argues that Indonesia’s forest governance
policy development is characterized by a path-dependence institution. Path dependence is about a path that resists and is hostiles to any
change and the case of forest governance in Indonesia is one the examples in this context. The forest governance policy is to serve central
bureaucracy interest, mainly the Ministry of Forestry. The Ministry is
the core bureaucracy of Forestry Laws and is responsible for governing,
administering and ensuring ecosystem preservation. The Ministry of
Forestry is also responsible for forest administration and forest management. The former term includes regulation, general planning and
granting rights. Meanwhile, the latter composes of planning, inventory
and management for income generation (Sahide et al. 2015). All these
administration capacities are assigned to the Ministry of Forestry, which
tends to resist to any change as local governments only have authorities
to maintain control over forest park. Furthermore, Sahide et al. (2016)
describes clearly that the establishment of Forest Management Unit
(KPH) and Community Forestry are utilized effectively by central government for reclaiming authority over forest land.
Regarding the fiscal forest policy, the tendency to maintain the central government control over forestry can also be seen at fiscal transfer
policy. It has been revealed that intergovernmental fiscal transfers are
to serve central bureaucracy interests (Nurfatriani et al. 2015). With
this policy, local governments do not have the authority to develop
Non-Tax State Revenue (NTSR) and manage forestry fiscal balancing
regulations. Nurfatriani et al. (2015) found that there is a positive correlation between deforestation and shared revenue. It indicates the close
relationship between reducing forest assets and generating revenue for
districts. It occurs because there is no ‘punishing mechanism’ to districts which do not have a plan for sustainable forest management. In short,
the implementation of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Indonesia
was not designed for forest conservation.
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CONCLUSION

The study reveals that the evolution of forest governance in Indonesia
is marked by the contestation between local and central government.
Although there have been many efforts to reform forest governance,
institutional resistance appears to be undermining the efforts. The values of forest and its land have produced not only a half-hearted reform
but also reaffirmed the central government control over forests. Along
with the reform initiatives, the central government tends to reinforce
its power rather than to accommodate local needs and to strengthen
local capacity for better forest management.
Despite the prolonged tendency toward centralization, the progress
of forest management policy in Indonesia may not be necessarily gloomy. The development of current policy stages suggests that social and
environmental aspects are more taken into account and there is a promising improvement in the relations between the center and the locals.
One of the potential sources to promote collaboration and reconciliation between central and local government is through the framework
of REDD+ (Phelps, Webb, and Agrawal 2010). The development of
environmental projects and REDD+ may increase the monetary value
of forest and an income for the country. Increasing economic values of
forest and its land will generate “increasing economic return” and it will
perhaps clarify the remaining interest of central government over forest.
Given the certain commonalities of centralization tendencies after
decentralization of forest management in developing countries, the findings of this study may have implications for other countries in which
forest policies are evolved and developed. As Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson
(2006) notes, a broad coalition may counter-balance the centralizing
tendencies. The coalition which composes diverse interest groups from
different sectors of society and government could become a medium
for promoting decentralization. The findings prompt some questions
needed for further investigations, such as how to break the persistence
of central government, how to unlock the prospect for further reform,
or how to understand the mechanism of reproduction sustaining persistence.
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